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WHEN THE STATE ENCOUNTERS A




Each phase in the long history of the world economy raises specific
questions of governance. One of the key properties of the current phase
is the ascendance of information technologies and the resulting increase
in the mobility and liquidity of capital. This is particularly evident in
today's leading information industries, international finance and the
advanced corporate services, which lie at the heart of the global infor-
mation economy. The hypermobility of these industries has led to a
distinct line of theorization about economic globalization in general.
Theorists increasingly conceptualize the global economy in terms of the
new technical capacities for instantaneous transmission of information
outputs over any distance and the associated neutralization of place. This
in turn feeds into propositions about the shrinking role of the state in an
increasingly global economy.
This article examines the underside of globalization to show that the
dominant line of theorization, with its emphasis on the hypermobility
and liquidity of capital, is a partial account. Further, this account is par-
tial in a way that carries significant implications for questions of state-
and non-state-centered regulatory capacities and, more generally, ques-
tions of governance in a global economy.
This article seeks to recover such categories as place, infrastructure,
and production process in the analysis of economic globalization. To do
so, it focuses on industries that are among the most intensive users of
telecommunications and computer networks, the indispensable technology
* © Saskia Sassen. Professor of Urban Planning, Columbia University. The au-
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of today's global economy. Understanding the role of place, and specifi-
cally of place-bound infrastructures and place-bound work processes, in
these highly mobile industries may illuminate aspects of the role of the
state in economic globalization, that qualify the notion of the state's
shrinking regulatory capacity vis-a-vis multinationals and global finance.
Precisely because advanced information industries are deeply embed-
ded in telematics, they also shed light on questions of control in the
global economy that not only go beyond the state but also transcend the
notions of non-state-centered systems of coordination prevalent in the
literature on governance. These questions of control arise partly due to
the orders of magnitude that financial markets can achieve thanks to the
speed of transactions. This is well exemplified by the foreign currency
markets; these markets operate largely in electronic space and have
reached volumes that leave the central banks incapable of exercising
their expected influence on exchange rates. These are questions of con-
trol that arise directly out of the properties of the new information tech-
nologies rather than out of the extension of the economy beyond the
state.
Such questions have become particularly important over the last fif-
teen years, beginning with the disintegration of the international order
ruled by the Bretton Woods agreements and United States dominance.
They cannot be subsumed under more traditional conceptions which see
the world economy as consisting of international trade relations and
certain types of foreign investment-two categories of international
activity that do indeed operate through governmental control. The col-
lapse of the Bretton Woods agreement and of United States dominance
appears to have created an organizational void filled by the rules of
multinational corporations and global financial markets. These major
economic actors now impose criteria for economic performance on rich
and poor nations through mechanisms that escape traditional forms of
accountability'
These developments signal an urgent need to produce new regimes for
international governance in the world economy, some conceivably in-
1. The concept "regulatory fracture" is used here rather than, say, violation, in
order to name a specific dynamic: that the materialization of global processes in a
place often produces a regulatory void. One result is that both "regulation" and "vio-
lation" become problematic categories and, at the limit, do not apply. One might
think of it analytically as a border-land, rather than a borderline-a terrain for ac-
tion/activity that remains underspecified at least from the perspective of regulation.
See Saskia Sassen, Regulatory Fractures: The Impact of Economic Globalization on
Concepts of Compliance and Violation, (forthcoming in J. INT'L L. & POL'Y, 1995).
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volving states and others not. The growth of a global economy has
transformed the meaning of, and the sites for, governance and account-
ability. Because the space economy of information industries is transna-
tional and operates partly in cyberspaces that override administrative
boundaries, it demonstrates the difficulties in implementing new systems
and sites for governance and accountability. At the same time, it reveals
new possibilities for governance resulting from the leading industries'
need for strategic sites situated in national territories, containing vast
concentrations of resources and infrastructure that are far less mobile
than much of the general commentary on the global economy suggests.
Two propositions organize this analysis! The first is that the global
economy materializes in concrete processes situated in specific places.
This holds for the most advanced information industries as well. This
proposition distinguishes the fact of global transmission/communication
from the material conditions that make it possible. And it overrides the
national-global duality, and therewith traditional conceptions of
territoriality contained in the notion of national sovereignty.
The second proposition is that the spatial dispersal of economic activi-
ty made possible by telematics will contribute to an expansion of central
functions if this dispersal occurs under the continuing concentration in
control, ownership, and profit appropriation that characterizes the current
economic system. More conceptually, the issue is whether an economic
system with strong tendencies towards such concentration can have a
space economy that lacks points of physical agglomeration.
From these two propositions a series of analytic pathways leads to
questions of place and production and to the place-boundedness of vari-
ous aspects of economic globalization. Recovering this place-
boundedness also reshapes the notion of the shrinking role of the state
in today's global information economy because these places are largely
embedded in national territories, and hence fall under various state-cen-
tered regulatory umbrellas. The organizing focus in this brief essay is
the space economy of information industries at a time when the devel-
opment of telematics maximizes the potential for geographic dispersal
and mobility. The essay seeks to add to our understanding of questions
of governance in the global economy by showing how the space econo-
my for major new transnational economic processes diverges in signifi-
cant ways from the global/national duality which much analysis of the
2. See SASKIA SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CrrY: NEW YORK, LODON, TOKYO (1991)
[hereinafter THE GLOBAL CITY]; SASKIA SASSEN, CITIES IN A WORLD EcONOMY
(1994) [hereinafter CrrIEs IN A WORLD ECONOMY].
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global economy presupposes.
I. WHEN THE STATE ENCOUNTERS A NEW SPACE ECONOMY
A focus on the space economy of advanced information industries can
illuminate three issues that are central to discussions about the role of
the state in the global economy. The first of these is the need for firms
operating transnationally to ensure the functions that the state has tradi-
tionally exercised in the national realm of the economy, notably guaran-
teeing property rights and contracts.
The second issue is the deregulation of key operations and markets,
which can be seen as a negotiation among nation-based legal regimes
and the formation of a consensus among a growing number of states
about furthering the world economy. A focus on the space economy of
information industries elaborates and specifies the meaning of deregula-
tion insofar as important components of these industries are embedded
in particular sites within national territories and others are located in
electronic spaces that escape all conventional jurisdictions or borders.
The third issue is the formation of non-state institutions and non-state
forms of authority with regulatory capacities. This includes the new
valorization dynamic embedded in both the ascendance of finance and
the advanced corporate services briefly described below.3 A new eco-
nomic complex is emerging with a valorization dynamic that is far less
articulated with the public economic functions of the state than the
valorization dynamics of other economic complexes, specifically Fordist
manufacturing.4 Global markets in finance and advanced services partly
operate through a "regulatory" umbrella that is market-centered rather
than state-centered. This raises a question of control linked to the cur-
rently inadequate capacities to govern transactions in electronic space.
3. See SASKIA SASSEN, CITIES IN A WORLD ECONOMY, supra note 2, ch. 4 and
6.
4. THE GLOBAL CITY, supra note 2. The implantation of global processes and
markets has meant that the internationalized sector of the economy has expanded
sharply and has imposed a new valorization dynamic-that is, a new set of criteria
for valuing or pricing various economic activities and outcomes. This has had devas-
tating effects on large sectors of the urban economy. Id. High prices and profit levels
in the internationalized sector and its ancillary activities, such as top-of-the-line restau-
rants and hotels, have made it increasingly difficult for other sectors to compete for
space and investments. Many of these other sectors have experienced considerable
downgrading and/or displacement, as, for example, neighborhood shops tailored to




Certain aspects of these three issues merit special mention.' Economic
globalization extends the economy beyond the nation-state's boundaries
and hence beyond its sovereignty, an observation that has become a
basic proposition in discussions of the global economy. This process is
particularly evident in the leading information industries. Existing sys-
tems of governance and accountability for transnational economic activi-
ties and entities leave much ungoverned when it comes to these indus-
tries and they do so in a very specific way. The forms of
transnationalization that have emerged over the last two decades are
distinct from those typical of other international systems, particularly the
era referred to as Pax Americana. This distinction may be described as
transnationalization or globalization versus internationalization.
A. THE EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION ON THE STATE
The state plays a distinct role in the long history of the construction
of global capitalism. As capital becomes global it does not necessarily
escape the state; rather, it forms a global economic system that operates
beyond the regulatory umbrella of a single state. In the three decades
after World War II, the period of the Pax Americana, economic interna-
tionalization had the effect of strengthening the interstate system.
International trade regimes organized the leading economic sectors,
especially manufacturing and raw materials extraction, reinforcing this
system. Individual states adjusted national economic policies to further
this version of the world economy. But certain sectors did not fit com-
fortably under this largely trade dominated inter-state regime: out of
their escape emerged the Euro-markets and off-shore tax havens of the
1960s
The breakdown of the Bretton Woods system produced an internation-
al governance void that multinationals and global financial markets
rapidly filled. This fed the notion of the shrinking role of the state6 and
the debate about non-state centered systems of governance According
5. See id.
6. Cf. Bob Jessop, THATCHERISM: THE BRITISH ROAD TO Pos'rFoRDist? (1989).
7. J.N. Rosenau, Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics, in GOVER-
NANCE WrrHouT GOVERNtMNT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORW POLTICs 1-29 (J.N.
Rosenau & E.O. Czempiel eds., 1992); O.R. Young, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION:
BUILDING REGIMES FOR NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1989); Jan
Kooiman & Martin van Viet, Governance and Public Management, in MANAGING
PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS: LEsSONS FROM CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN ExsERIENCE 58-
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to some,' a new doctrine now redefines the role of states. Inside the
state we see a further shift of power away from those agencies most
closely tied to domestic social forces, which dominated during the Pax
Americana, and towards those closest to the transnational process of
consensus formation.9
A focus on international finance and corporate services highlights the
extent to which the forms of internationalization evident in the last two
decades have not necessarily had the effect of strengthening the inter-
state system as was the case with the Pax Americana. These new forms
have produced regulatory voids that lie beyond not only states but also
the inter-state system. In this regard, an analysis of these industries
underlines the distinction between earlier forms of internationalization,
and the role of the state within these forms, and the current globaliza-
tion of economic activity evident in some (by no means all) economic
sectors.
This raises a question about the state's role in the new space econo-
my of advanced information industries. At the least, one effect of chang-
es in the leading information industries is a transformation in the role of
the state in these industries. Where industries have been deregulated and
are increasingly international, the significance of the nation-state de-
clines.'" If the significance of the national state in the world economy
is declining, then many existing systems of governance for international
activity may have become increasingly inadequate insofar as they rest
inordinately on the nation-state.
72 (K.A. Eliassen & Jan Kooiman eds., 1993); A. Leftwich, Governance, the State,
and the Politics of Development, 24 DEV. & CHANGE 363-86 (1994).
8. See Leo Panitch, Rethinking the Role of the State in an Era of Globalization,
in 9 YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (J. Mittelman ed., 1995).
9. Many of these changes, of course, required explicit government action.
Pastor's study on the arduous legislative road to open up the United States to foreign
investment is a good case in point. ROBERT A. PASTOR, CONGRESS & THE POLITICS
OF U.S. FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY, 1929-1976 (1980).
10. And it raises a question about a declining significance of nation-based citi-
zenship, at least in many of the advanced industrialized countries that receive large
numbers of immigrants and are the site for the new transnational professional class.
SASKIA SASSEN, ON GOVERNING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: THE 1995 LEONARD
HASTINGS SCHOFF MEMORIAL LECTURES, PUBLISHED BY COLUMBIA UNIV. PRESS
(forthcoming 1996) [hereinafter GOVERNING THE WORLD ECONOMY]. This raises a
question about the possible emergence of new forms of "citizenship." One is reminded
of Lefebvre's proposition about the right to the city, as well as of the new rights of




There are various sites for governance in the world economy beyond
the nation-state, but many of these ultimately derive their authority from
the latter. Among these are organizations involved with international
economic issues, from the International Chamber of Commerce and the
Court of Justice at The Hague, to the documents for, and authorized
committees working on, the Single European Market and the free trade
agreement between the United States, Canada, and Mexico.
The existence of such international bodies raises the question whether
their inadequacy to regulate global markets results from the particular
institutional forms through which they rest on the national state, or from
the "obsoleteness" of the modem state itself. The former hypothesis
compels an inquiry into other possible modes of articulation between na-
tional states and international governance that could restore the effective-
ness of international systems of governance. The latter requires an
investigation of alternative conceptions of systems for international gov-
ernance that may not rest at all on national states."
B. DEREGULATION
Deregulation and transnationalization are key characteristics of the
space economy of today's leading information industries. Deregulation
has been a crucial mechanism to negotiate the juxtaposition of the
global and the national. Deregulation of financial markets has had the
effect of partly de-nationalizing national territory; the international
banking facilities in the United States are an example. In other words, it
is not simply a matter of a space economy extending beyond a national
realm
There are parallels here with the formation of transnational legal
regimes. 2 National legal fields are becoming more internationalized in
some of the major developed economies and transnational legal regimes
are growing more important as they begin to penetrate national fields
hitherto closed. The hegemony of neo-liberal concepts of economic
relations, with its strong emphasis on markets, deregulation, and free
international trade, influenced policy in the United States and the United
11. For a full development of some of these issues, see GOVMNG THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY, supra note 10.
12. E.g., DAvID M. TRUBEK ET AL., GLOBAL RESTRUCTURING AND THE LAw:
THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF LEGAL FIELDS AND CREATION OF TRANSNATIONAL
ARENAS (Global Studies Research Program, University of Wisconsin, Working Papers
Series on the Political Economy of Legal Change, No. 1, 1993).
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Kingdom in the 1980s and is now increasingly influential also in conti-
nental Europe. This has contributed to the formation of transnational
legal regimes that are centered on Western economic concepts. 3
Through the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), as well as the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), this vision has spread to
the developing world.
Transnational economic processes inevitably interact with systems for
the governance of national economies. Insofar as global processes mate-
rialize in concrete places, they continue to operate under sovereign regu-
latory umbrellas. Furthermore, the state continues to function as the
guarantor of the domestic and global rights of capital and it does so for
both national and foreign capital. The challenge the state faces in fulfill-
ing these functions as the space economy of key industries extends
beyond the national borders need not have as its sole outcome a shrink-
ing role for the state. It might well entail internal transformations in the
state.
II. PLACE AND PRODUCTION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
The analysis of the space economy developed here is centered in the
notion that we cannot take the existence of a global economic system as
a given, but rather need to examine the particular ways in which the
conditions for economic globalization are produced. This entails examin-
ing not only communication capacities and the power of multinationals,
but also the underside of the global economy.
The capabilities for global operation, coordination and control con-
tained in the new information technologies and in the power of the
multinationals need to be produced. Focusing on the production of these
capabilities adds a neglected dimension to the familiar issue of the pow-
er of large corporations and the dispersal potential of new technologies.
The emphasis shifts to the practice of global control: producing and
reproducing the organization and management of a global production
system and a global marketplace for finance, both under conditions of
economic concentration.
13. An issue that is emerging as significant in view of the spread of western
legal concepts is the critical examination of the philosophical premises about author-
ship and property that define the legal arena in the West. See, e.g., Rosemary J.
Coombe, The Properties of Culture and the Politics of Processing Identity: Native




Producer services, and most especially finance and advanced corporate
services, are industries that produce the organizational commodities
necessary for the implementation and management of global economic
systems. 4 Over the last few years a rich literature has developed on
the producer services, including major information industries such as
international finance and advanced corporate services. 5 With a few ex-
ceptions," this literature has not necessarily been concerned with the
global economy, nor has it been seen as part of the literature on global-
ization. Introducing this type of research into the analysis of the global
economy helps explore how the categories of place and production,
which are easily overlooked in analyses of the hypermobiity of capital
and the power of multinationals, are involved in economic globalization.
Developing categories such as place and production process does not
negate the centrality of hypermobility and power. It adds other dimen-
sions and in so doing intersects with the regulatory role of the state in a
distinct way; one that diverges from much international political econo-
my.
Much attention has focused on the territorial dispersal of economic
activity on a national and world scale made possible by the massive
development of telematics. Less attention has been paid to the need that
this dispersal creates for expanded central control and management, if
the dispersal is to occur under conditions of continued economic concen-
tration.
The domestic and international dispersal of loci of growth and the
globalization of finance bring to the fore questions concerning the incor-
poration of such growth into the profit-generating processes that contrib-
14. THE GLOBAL CITY, supra note 2, chs. 2-5. Producer services are intermediate
outputs, that is, services bought by firms. They cover financial, legal, and general
management matters, innovation, development, design, administration, personnel, pro-
duction technology, maintenance, transport, communications, wholesale distribution,
advertising, cleaning services for firms, security, and storage. Central components of
the producer services category are a range of industries with mixed business and
consumer markets. They are insurance, banking, financial services, real estate, legal
services, accounting, and professional associations.
15. PETER W. DANIELS, SERVICE INDUSTMES: A GEOGRAPHICAL APPRAISAL
(1985); see, e.g., Peter W. Daniels, Producer Services and the Development of the
Space Economy, in THE CHANGING GEOGRAPHY OF ADVANCED PRODUCER SERvICEs
(Peter NV. Daniels & Frank Moulaert eds., 1991); JEAN CLAUDE DELAUNEY & JEAN
GADREY, LES ENJEUX DE LA SOCIEM DE SERVICE (1987).
16. MANUEL CASTELLS, THE INFORMATIONAL CrrY (1989); THE GLOBAL CrrY,
supra note 3, chs. 2-5; Mathew P. Drennan, Information Intensive Industries in Metro-
politan Areas of the United States, 21 ENV'T & PLANNING 1603-18 (1989).
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ute to economic concentration. While in principle the territorial decen-
tralization of economic activity could have been accompanied by a cor-
responding decentralization in ownership and hence in the appropriation
of profits, there has been little movement in that direction. Though large
firms have increased their subcontracting to smaller firms and many
national firms in the newly industrializing countries have grown rapidly,
this form of growth is ultimately part of a chain in which a limited
number of corporations continue to control the end product and to reap
the profits associated with selling on the world market. 7 Even industri-
al homeworkers in remote rural areas are now part of that chain.'8
This is evident not only with respect to firms, but also with respect to
places. The internationalization and expansion of finance has brought
growth to a large number of smaller financial markets, feeding the ex-
pansion of the global industry. But top level control and management
have become concentrated in a few leading financial centers. These
continue to account for a disproportionate share of all financial transac-
tions, notwithstanding rapid growth since the early 1980s.
The fundamental dynamic posited here is that the more globalized the
economy becomes the higher the agglomeration of central functions. The
extremely high densities evident in the downtown districts of global
cities are one of the spatial expressions of this logic. The widely accept-
ed notion that agglomeration has become obsolete when global telecom-
munication advances allow for maximum dispersal is only partly correct.
Indeed, it is precisely because of the territorial dispersal facilitated by
telecommunication advances that agglomeration of centralizing activities
has expanded sharply. 9 This is a key dynamic that explains the place
of major cities in the world economy: certain cities concentrate the
17. U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., PROGRAMME ON TRANSNAT'L CORPS.,
WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1992: TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AS ENGINES OF
GROWrH, U.N. Sales No. E.92.II.A.19 (1992); U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV.,
PROGRAMME ON TRANSNAT'L CORPS., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1993: TRANSNA-
TIONAL CORPORATIONS & INTEGRATED INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION, U.N. Sales No.
E.93.II.A.14 (1993).
18. Lucie Cheng & Gary Gereffi, U.S. Retailers and Asian Garment Production,
in GLOBAL PRODUCTION: THE APPAREL INDUSTRY IN THE PACIFIC RIM (Edna
Bonacich et al. eds., 1994); Lourdes Beneria, Subcontracting and Employment Dynam-
ics in Mexico City, in THE INFORMAL ECONOMY: STUDIES IN ADVANCED & LESS
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (Alejandro Portes et al. eds., 1989).
19. It is incorrect in my view to confine such central roles to headquarter's func-




infrastructure and the servicing that produce a capability for global con-
trol. The latter is essential if geographic dispersal of economic activi-
ty-whether factories, offices or financial markets-is to take place
under continued concentration of ownership and profit appropriation.
This is not a mere continuation of old patterns of agglomeration but,
one could posit, a new logic for agglomeration.
Information technologies make possible the geographic dispersal and
simultaneous integration of many activities. But the distinct conditions
under which such facilities are available have promoted centralization of
the most advanced users in the most advanced telecommunications cen-
ters. Even though a few newer urban centers have built advanced tele-
communications facilities, entry costs are increasingly high, and there is
a tendency for telecommunications to be developed in conjunction with
major users-typically firms with large national and global markets!'
Indeed, there is a close relationship between the growth of international
markets for finance and trade, the tendency for major firms to concen-
trate in major cities, and the development of telecommunications infra-
structures in these cities. Firms with global markets or global production
processes require advanced telecommunications facilities. And the accel-
eration and internationalization of financial markets make access to
advanced telecommunications facilities essential. The main demand for
telecommunication services comes from information-intensive industries
which, in turn, tend to locate in major cities which have such facilities.
For instance, in 1992, New York City had well over 700 buildings
served by fiber optic cable-the largest concentration in the
world-followed by over 500 such buildings each in London and To-
kyo, with significantly smaller concentrations in other cities.
Looking at cities as production sites for the leading service industries
of our time makes it possible to recover the infrastructure of activities,
firms, and jobs that is necessary to run the advanced corporate economy,
including its global components. Specialized services are usually under-
stood in terms of specialized outputs rather than the production process
involved. A focus on the production process in these service industries
allows us both to capture some of their locational characteristics, and to
examine the proposition that there is a new dynamic for agglomeration
in the advanced corporate services because they function as a production
complex that serves corporate headquarters, yet has distinct locational
and production characteristics. It is this producer services complex, more
than headquarters of firms generally, that benefits and often needs a city
20. CASTELLs, supra note 16.
19951 779
AM. U. J. INTL L. & POL'Y
location.
We see this dynamic for agglomeration operating at different levels of
the urban hierarchy, from the global to the regional. At the global level,
some cities concentrate the infrastructure and the servicing that produce
a capability for global control. With the potential for global control
capability, certain cities are becoming nodal points in a vast communica-
tions and market system. Advances in electronics and telecommunication
have transformed geographically distant cities into centers for global
communication and long-distance management. But centralized control
and management over a geographically dispersed array of plants, offices,
and service outlets does not come about inevitably as part of a "world
system." It requires the development of a vast range of highly special-
ized services and of top-level management and control functions. Much
analysis and general commentary on the global economy and the new
growth sectors does not incorporate these multiple dimensions.
Ill. THE INTERSECTION OF GLOBALIZATION
AND THE SHIFT TO SERVICES
These developments need to be seen against the intersection of two
major processes. One is the sharp growth in the globalization of eco-
nomic activity. The second is the growing service intensity in the orga-
nization of all industries. Economic globalization has raised the scale
and the complexity of transactions, thereby feeding the growth of top-
level multinational headquarters functions and the growth of producer
services. But such operations are also evident at smaller geographic
scales and lower orders of complexity, as is the case with firms that
operate regionally. Thus while regionally oriented firms need not negoti-
ate the complexities of international borders and the regulations of dif-
ferent countries, they are still faced with a regionally dispersed network
of operations that requires centralized control and servicing.
The second process we need to consider is the growing service inten-
sity in the organization of all industries."' This has contributed to a
massive growth in the demand for services by firms in all industries,
from mining and manufacturing to finance and consumer services.2
21. THE GLOBAL CITY, supra note 2.
22. THE GLOBAL CrrT, supra note 2, at 166-68. The expansion of producer
services is a central feature of current growth in developed countries. In country after
country, we see a decline or slowdown in manufacturing alongside sharp growth in
producer services. Elsewhere it has been argued that the fundamental reason for this
growth lies in the increased service intensity in the organization of all industries. Id.
780 [VOL. 10:2
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Cities are key sites for the production of services for firms. The in-
creased service intensity in the organization of all industries has had a
significant growth effect on cities beginning in the 1980s. Again, one
must recognize that this growth in services for firms occurs in cities at
different levels of a nation's urban system. Some of these cities cater to
regional or subnational markets; others serve national markets; and yet
others support global markets. In this context, globalization becomes a
question of scale and added complexity.
The key process from the perspective of the space economy is the
growing demand for services by firms in all industries and the fact that
cities are preferred production sites for such services, whether at the
global, national, or regional level. As a result, a new urban economic
core of banking and service activities comes to replace the older, typi-
cally manufacturing-oriented, core.' In the case of cities that are major
international business centers, the scale, power, and profit levels of this
new core are vast.2 4
at 166-68. Whether in manufacturing or in warehousing, firms use more legal, finan-
cial, advertising, consulting, and accounting services. These services can be seen as
part of the supply capacity of an economy because they facilitate adjustments to
changing economic circumstances; they are part of a broader intermediary space of
economic activity.
23. Though disproportionately concentrated in the largest cities, producer services
are actually growing at faster rates at the national level in most developed economies.
The crucial process feeding the growth of producer services is the increasing use of
service inputs by firms in all industries. Households have also raised their consump-
tion of services, either directly (e.g., the growing use of accountants for preparation
of tax returns), or indirectly via the reorganization of consumer industries (e.g., buy-
ing flowers or dinner from franchises or chains rather than self-standing and privately
owned "mom-and-pop" shops). Services directly bought by consumers tend to be
located wherever population is concentrated. In that regard they are far less concen-
trated than producer services, especially those catering to top firms. The demand for
specialized services by households, from accounting to architects, is one key factor
contributing to the growth of these services at the national level.
24. It suggests that the formation of a new urban economy is taking place in
these major cities. This is so in at least two regards. First, even though these cities
have long been centers for business and finance, since the late 1970s there have been
dramatic changes in the structure of the business and financial sectors, as well as
sharp increases in the overall magnitude of these sectors and their weight in the
urban economy. Second, the ascendance of the new finance and services complex,
particularly international finance, engenders what may be regarded as a new economic
regime, that is, although this sector may account for only a fraction of the economy
of a city, it imposes itself on that larger economy. Most notably, the possibility for
superprofits in finance has the effect of devaluing manufacturing insofar as the latter
cannot generate the superprofits typical in much financial activity. This is not to say
1995]
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The evidence on the locational patterns of the leading information
industries shows sharp concentration in major cities. For instance, New
York City accounts for thirty-five percent of national earnings in pro-
ducer services, compared to little over three of the national population,
and between a fourth and a fifth of all producer services exports in the
United States (which total about forty billion dollars annually).' Lon-
don accounts for about forty percent of producer services exports in the
United Kingdom, and Paris accounts for forty percent of all producer
services employment in France and over eighty percent of the advanced
corporate services.26 There are many other such examples.
According to standard conceptions about information industries, the
rapid growth and disproportionate concentration of producer services in
major cities should not have happened. Because they are thoroughly
embedded in the most advanced information technologies, producer
services could be expected to have locational options that bypass the
high costs and congestion typical of major cities. In order to understand
their sharp concentration in large cities, we need to focus on the actual
production process in these industries.
IV. THE FORMATION OF A NEW PRODUCTION COMPLEX
The production process in these services benefits from proximity to
other specialized services. This is especially the case in the leading and
most innovative sectors of these industries. Complexity and innovation
often require multiple highly specialized inputs from several industries.
The production of a financial instrument, for example, requires inputs
from accounting, advertising, legal expertise, economic consulting, public
relations, designers, and printers. The particular characteristics of produc-
tion of these services, especially those involved in complex and innova-
tive operations, explain their pronounced concentration in major cities.
The commonly heard explanation that high level professionals require
face-to-face interactions needs to be refined in several ways. Producer
services, unlike other types of services, are not necessarily dependent on
spatial proximity to the consumers, i.e. firms served. Rather, economies
occur in such specialized firms when they locate close to others that
produce key inputs or whose proximity makes possible joint production
of certain service offerings. The accounting firm can service its clients
that everything in the economy of these cities has changed; it hasn't.
25. Drennan, supra note 16.
26. CITIES IN A WORLD ECONOMY, supra note 2.
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at a distance, but the nature of its service depends on proximity to
specialists, such as lawyers and programmers. Moreover, concentration
arises out of the needs and expectations of the people likely to be em-
ployed in these new high-skill jobs who tend to be attracted to the
amenities and lifestyles that large urban centers can offer. Frequently,
what is thought of as face-to-face communication is actually a produc-
tion process that requires multiple simultaneous inputs and feedbacks. At
the current stage of technical development, immediate and simultaneous
access to the pertinent experts is still the most effective way, especially
when dealing with a highly complex product. The concentration of the
most advanced telecommunications and computer network facilities in
major cities is a key factor in what I refer to as the production process
of these industries.27
Further, time replaces weight in these sectors as a force for agglomer-
ation. In the past, the pressure of the weight of inputs, from iron ore to
unprocessed agricultural products, was a major constraint pushing toward
agglomeration in sites where the heaviest inputs were located. Today,
the acceleration of economic transactions and the premium put on time
have created new forces for agglomeration, this is increasingly not the
case in routine operations. But where time is of the essence, as it is
today in many of the leading sectors of these industries, the benefits of
agglomeration are still extremely high--to the point where it is not
simply a cost advantage, but an indispensable arrangement.
There is a general trend toward high concentration of finance and
certain producer services in the downtowns of major international finan-
cial centers around the world: from Toronto and Sydney to Frankfurt
and Zurich, there is a growing specialization in financial districts every-
where. It is worth noting that this trend is also evident in the multipolar
urban system of the United States: against all odds, New York City has
27. M. Moss, Telecommunications and the Future of Cities, 3 LAND DEy. STUD-
iEs 33-44 (1986); M. Moss, New Fibers of Urban Economic Development, 4 PORT-O-
ijo: A QrLY. REv. OF TRADE & TRANsp. 11-18 (1991). The telecommunications
infrastructure also contributes to concentration of leading sectors in major cities. Long-
distance communications systems increasingly use fiber optic wires. These have several
advantages over traditional copper wire: large carrying capacity, high speed, more
security, and higher signal strength. Fiber systems tend to connect major communica-
tions hubs because they are not easily spliced and hence not desirable for connecting
multiple lateral sites. Fiber systems tend to be installed along existing rights of way,
whether rail, water or highways. Moss, supra; Moss, New Fibers, supra. The growing
use of fiber optic systems thus tends to strengthen the major existing telecommunica-
tion concentrations and therefore the existing hierarchies.
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kept its place at the top in terms of concentration in banking and fi-
nance.
All of this strongly suggests that the agglomeration of producer ser-
vices in major cities actually constitutes a production complex. This
producer services complex is intimately connected to the world of cor-
porate headquarters. While the two are often thought of as forming a
joint headquarters-corporate services complex, it is necessary to distin-
guish them. Although it is true that headquarters still tend to be
disproportionately concentrated in cities, over the last two decades many
have moved out. Headquarters can indeed locate outside cities, but they
need a producer services complex somewhere in order to buy or contract
for the needed specialized services and financing. Further, headquarters
of firms with very high overseas activity or in highly innovative and
complex lines of business tend to locate in major cities. In brief, firms
in more routinized lines of activity, with predominantly regional or
national markets, appear to be increasingly free to move or install their
headquarters outside cities. Firms in highly competitive and innovative
lines of activity and/or with a strong world market orientation appear to
benefit from being located in major international business centers, no
matter how high the costs.
Both types of firms, though, need a corporate services complex to be
located somewhere. The location of this complex is probably increas-
ingly unimportant from the perspective of many, though not all, head-
quarters. From the perspective of producer services firms, such a special-
ized complex is most likely to be in a city rather than, for example, a
suburban office park. The latter will be the site for producer services
firms but not for a services complex. And only such a complex is capa-
ble of handling the most advanced and complicated corporate demands.
A. SPATIAL CONCENTRATION: SOME EMPIRICAL REFERENTS
Elsewhere, a somewhat detailed empirical examination of several cities
served to explore different aspects of this trend towards spatial concen-
tration in leading sectors of finance and the producer services." Here,
there is space only for a few observations.29
28. CITIES IN A WORLD ECONOMY, supra note 2.
29. Though at a different order of magnitude, these trends also became evident
during the late 1980s in a number of major cities in the developing world that have
become integrated into various world markets: Sao Paulo, Buenos Aires, Bangkok,
Taipei, and Mexico City are only a few examples. Also here the new urban core was
fed by the deregulation of financial markets, ascendance of finance and specialized
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The case of Toronto, a city whose financial district was built up only
in recent years, makes it possible to see to what extent the pressure
towards physical concentration is embedded in an economic dynamic
rather than simply being the consequence of a built infrastructure inher-
ited from the past (as one could think was the case in older centers
such as London or New York). But the case also shows that it is partic-
ular industries which are subject to the pressure towards spatial concen-
tration, notably finance and its sister industries." We see a similar
growth in the financial concentration and specialization of the down-
towns of such cities as Frankfurt and Zurich.
The case of Sydney illuminates the interaction of a vast, continental
economic scale and pressures towards spatial concentration. Rather than
strengthening the multipolarity of the Australian urban system, the devel-
opments of the 1980s-increased internationalization of the Australian
economy, sharp increases in foreign investment, a strong shift towards
finance, real estate and producer services-contributed to a greater con-
centration of major economic activities and actors in Sydney. This in-
cluded a loss of share of such activities and actors by Melbourne, long
the center of commercial activity and wealth in Australia."
Finally, the case of the leading financial centers in the world today is
of continued interest since one might have expected that the growing
number of financial centers now integrated into the global markets
would have reduced the extent of concentration of financial activity in
the top centers.' One would further expect this given the immense
services, and integration into the world markets. The opening of stock markets to
foreign investors and the privatization of what were once public sector firms have
been crucial institutional arenas for this articulation. Given the vast size of some of
these cities, the impact of this new core on the broader city is not always as evident
as in central London or Frankfurt, but the transformation is still very real.
30. Gunter Gad, Toronto's Financial District, I CANADIAN URBAN LANDSCAPES
203-07 (1991).
31. M.T. Daly & R. Stimson, Sydney: Australia's Gateway and Financial Capital,
in NEw CmEs OF THE PACIFIC Ri (E. Blakely & TJ. Stimpson eds., 1992).
32. THE GLOBAL Crry, supra note 2, ch. 7. Furthermore, this unchanged level of
concentration has happened at a time when financial services are more mobile than
ever before: globalization, deregulation (an essential ingredient for globalization), and
securitization have been the key to this mobility-in the context of massive advances
in telecommunications and electronic networks. One result is that much of the grow-
ing competition for hypermobile financial activity is confined largely to about ten
major centers. There has been an overemphasis on competition in general and in
specialized accounts on this subject. There is also a functional division of labor
among various major financial centers. Id. In that sense we can think of a transna-
1995]
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
increases in the global volume of transactions. Yet the levels of concen-
tration remain unchanged in the face of massive transformations in the
financial industry and in the technological infrastructure this industry
depends on. 3
For example, international bank lending grew from $1.89 trillion in
1980 to $6.24 trillion in 1991-a fivefold increase in a mere ten years.
New York, London, and Tokyo accounted for forty-two percent of all
such international lending in 1980 and for forty-one percent in 1991,
according to data from the Bank of International Settlements, the leading
institution worldwide overseeing banking activity. There were
compositional changes: Japan's share rose from 6.2% to 15.1% and the
United Kingdom's fell from 26.2% to 16.3%; the United States share
remained constant. All increased in absolute terms. Beyond these three,
Switzerland, France, Germany, and Luxembourg bring the total share of
the top centers to sixty-four percent in 1991, which is just about the
same share these countries had in 1980. One city, Chicago, dominates
the world's trading in futures, accounting for sixty percent of worldwide
contracts in options and futures in 1991.
B. THE GEOGRAPHY OF CENTRALITY
The two preceding sections describe a geography of centrality, a ge-
ography of the center in a global information economy. Today there is
no longer a simple straightforward relation between centrality and such
geographic entities as the downtown or the central business district
(CBD). In the past, and up to quite recently in fact, the center was
synonymous with the downtown or the CBD. Today, the spatial corre-
late of the center can assume several geographic forms. The space econ-
omy of the leading information industries is increasingly transnational
and has several geographic correlates.
The central business district, as it still is largely in New York City or
London, remains a powerful fact, and one that regained critical mass in
the 1980s. A second geographic correlate is the metropolitan area, par-
ticularly in the form of a grid of nodes of intense business activity
connected via telematics, as we see in Frankfurt or Zurich.34 A third
tional system with multiple locations.
33. Much of the discussion around the formation of a single European market
and financial system has raised the possibility, and even the need if it is to be com-
petitive, of centralizing financial functions and capital in a limited number of cities
rather than maintaining the current structure in which each country has a financial
center.
34. HANSRUEDI Hrrz, FINANCIAL METROPOLES IN REsTRUCTURING: ZURICH AND
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correlate has elsewhere been described as the formation of a
transterritorial "center" constituted via telematics and intense economic
transactions; New York, London and Tokyo could be seen as constitut-
ing such a transterritorial terrain of centrality with regard to a specific
complex of industries and activities.35 Fourth, we may increasingly see
non-geographic terrains for the operations of the leading information
industries, disembodied spaces that lack any geographic correlate, exist-
ing only in the electronically generated space sometimes called
cyberspace. Certain components of the financial industry, particularly the
foreign currency markets, can be seen as operating partly in
cyberspace.'
In brief, the combination of spatial dispersal and global integration
has contributed to a strategic role for certain types of places in the
current phase of the world economy. This is most evident with major
cities. Beyond their sometimes long history as centers for world trade
and banking, such cities now function as command points in the organi-
zation of the world economy, as key locations and marketplaces for the
leading industries of this period, finance and corporate services, and as
sites for the production of these services.
CONCLUSION
The analysis of the space economy of finance and the advanced services
brings two distinct dimensions to the discussion about economic global-
ization and the shrinking role of the state. On the one hand it shows
how global processes materialize in place-specific complexes, including
vast concentrations of advanced infrastructure. These specific sites do in
many ways fall under the regulatory umbrella of the state and insofar as
they are strategic sites, which they are, this is not a minor regulatory
foothold for the state. On the other hand, in these industries more so
FRANKFURT EN ROUTE TO POSTFORDISM (1995).
35. THE GLOBAL CTrY, supra note 2.
36. This also tells us something about cyberspace--often read as a purely techno-
logical event and in that sense a space of innocence. The cyberspaces of finance are
spaces where profits are produced and power is thereby constituted. Insofar as these
technologies strengthen the profit-making capability of finance and make possible the
hyper-mobility of finance capital, they also contribute to the often devastating impacts
of the ascendance of finance on other industries, on particular sectors of the popula-
tion, and on whole economies. Cyberspace, like any other space, can be inscribed in
a multiplicity of ways: some benevolent or enlightening;, others not. See Crrs IN A
WORLD ECONOMY, supra note 2.
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than in many others, a significant component of transactions and markets
operate in electronic space which is not subject to conventional jurisdic-
tions.
These two dimensions signal two opposing conditions. One is that
there are state-centered regulatory capacities which could be deployed to
govern strategic components of this new space economy. The other is
that the questions of control and regulation being engendered by the
electronic and telecommunications side of this new space economy lie
beyond much of the discussion about the shrinking role of the state in a
global economy. Once transactions are embedded in these new technolo-
gies, speed alone creates problems of control that are new and cannot be
handled through conventional state-centered or non-state forms of author-
ity. The most familiar case is that of the foreign currency markets where
volumes made possible by multiple transactions in a single day have left
the existing institutional apparatus, notably the central banks, impotent to
affect outcomes in these markets the way they once expected to.
The space economy of these industries points to a reconfiguration of
key parts of the governance debate. It is not simply a matter of global-
ization extending the economy beyond the reach of the state. It is also a
matter of control that goes beyond the issue of inter-organizational coor-
dination at the heart of governance theory. Insofar as speed is one of
the logics of the new information technologies, it is not always in corre-
spondence with the logic of the economic institutional apparatus.
The transformation in the composition of the world economy, espe-
cially the rise of finance and advanced services as leading industries, is
contributing to a new international economic order, one dominated by
financial centers, global markets, and transnational firms. The signifi-
cance of other political categories, both sub- and supra-national, may
grow accordingly. Cities that function as international business and fi-
nancial centers are sites for direct transactions with world markets that
take place without government inspection, as for instance the Euro-mar-
kets or New York City's international financial zone (International Bank-
ing Facilities).
These cities and the globally oriented markets and firms they contain
mediate in the relation of the world economy to nation-states and in the
relations among nation-states. Transnational economic processes inevita-
bly interact with systems for the governance of national economies.
Further, the material conditions necessary for many global economic
processes-from telematics infrastructure to the producer services pro-
duction complex-represent a potentially strategic regulatory site. New
forms of regulation and conditions for accountability need to be invent-
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ed: an exclusive focus on the hypermobility of capital will not lead to
such invention.
